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ABSTRACT 
 
In this exploratory study, we investigated the personal epistemologies of 
statisticians in academia with the aim of offering some insight into what might be an 
availing epistemology for learning statistics. Findings from in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with six academics in the UK currently researching within the field of 
statistics showed that their statistical personal epistemologies were consistent with 
constructivist theories of learning. Based on these findings, we proposed an integrated 
model to represent participants’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in statistics. 
Furthermore, we found differences between participants’ mathematical and statistical 
personal epistemologies, and we offered an argument for domain-specificity of 
personal epistemologies. The implications of our findings for research in statistics 
education and statistical misconceptions are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Statistics education research; Statistical misconceptions; Statistics vs. 
mathematics; University 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Misconceptions of statistical information and data are far too common. Research has 
indicated that students have difficulty understanding concepts relating to probability 
distributions (Ben-Zvi, 2004; Hammerman & Rubin, 2004), measures of variability 
(delMas & Liu, 2005; Garfield, 1995), sampling variation (delMas, Garfield, Ooms, & 
Chance, 2007; Reading & Shaughnessy, 2004), statistical inference (Castro Sotos, 
Vanhoof, Van den Noortgate, & Onghema, 2007), amongst others (for a summary of 
research in statistical misconceptions, see Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2007). Although instruction 
can improve students’ understanding of these concepts (Meletiou-Mavrotheris & Lee, 
2002; Sedlmeier, 1999), it is not always effective (Chance, delMas, & Garfield, 2004). One 
study even showed instruction to have a negative effect on students’ conceptual 
understanding of certain topics in statistics (delMas et al., 2007). Although misconceptions 
of knowledge exist across all disciplines, the issue seems to be especially pointed within 
statistics. This begs the question—what is it about statistics that makes it so difficult?  
Gaining insight into what makes learning difficult for students is a complicated task 
that has been approached in many ways. One of these ways relates to personal 
epistemologies. There is ample evidence to suggest that the epistemology of an individual 
—that is, their beliefs about knowledge and knowing—can affect how they come to learn 
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(e.g., Ernest, 2011; Hofer, 2000, 2004a; King & Kitchener, 1994, 2004; Pajares, 1992). 
The underlying idea is not that there is an objectively ‘correct’ way about understanding 
knowledge, but that there are certain epistemological beliefs that can be more conducive to 
learning (Muis, 2004). Thus, in order to offer some insight into why misconceptions are so 
rife in statistics, it would be helpful to identify what kind of beliefs about knowledge and 
knowing in statistics avail to a sophisticated understanding of the subject.  
Our aim in this paper is to begin to characterize what such an availing statistical 
epistemology might be. Many studies have noted that statistical misconceptions are still 
held by both advanced university students and experienced researchers outside of statistics 
(delMas et al., 2007; King & Kitchener, 1994), so in order to characterize such an 
epistemology, we focused on the beliefs of academics who are considered to be experts in 
statistics. This study differs from previous epistemological research relating to statistics 
education, because studies in the past have been non-empirical (Helmer & Rescher, 1959; 
Olsen & Morgan, 2005), specific to probabilistic thinking (Konold, 1989, 1991), or have 
focused on the beliefs of students or teachers (Garfield, 1995; Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2007; 
Shaughnessy, 2003). This study was therefore exploratory in nature, even though 
epistemological research within education and educational psychology is well developed.  
Specifically, in this paper we sought to identify main characteristics of the personal 
epistemologies of statisticians in academia and to match these personal epistemologies to 
existing models in the literature. Furthermore, given the inextricable link between statistics 
and mathematics, and the way in which statistics teaching is frequently embedded in 
mathematics, we also sought to explore similarities and differences between the statistical 
and mathematical epistemologies of statisticians in academia. Using in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with six statisticians in academia, we aimed to address the following 
research questions:  
1. What are some main characteristics of the personal epistemologies of statisticians 
in academia, and how do they relate to existing models of personal epistemologies 
in the literature?  
2. What are similarities and differences between the statistical and mathematical 
epistemologies of statisticians in academia? 
As a background for the paper, in the following section we review research on personal 
epistemologies in the context of statistics education.  
 
2. PERSONAL EPISTEMOLOGIES IN THE  
CONTEXT OF STATISTICS EDUCATION 
 
The beliefs that individuals have about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of 
a number of research studies, including studies on epistemological beliefs (Liu & Liu, 
2011; Schommer, 1990, 1998), epistemological theories (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Piaget, 
1972), epistemic beliefs (Buehl & Alexander, 2001), epistemic dimensions (Op ‘t Eynde, 
De Corte, & Verschaffel, 2006), ways of understanding (Confrey & Kazak, 2006), and 
many others. Although different terms have been used in these research studies, they all 
answer questions about what knowledge is and how it is acquired, and can be viewed as 
parts of the broader body of research on personal epistemology (Hofer, 2000, 2001, 2004b). 
The term personal epistemology has been used loosely in the past and has not always been 
defined. For the purpose of this paper, personal epistemology is understood to be the field 
concerning an individual’s beliefs about knowledge and knowing.  
The relationship between personal epistemology and education can be viewed through 
three general paradigms. The first maintains that epistemology is developmental and that a 
partial goal of education is to foster epistemological development (Finch & Cumming, 
337 
 
1998; Perry, 1970). Within statistics education, this paradigm is reflected in a study by 
delMas et al. (2007) which tracked the conceptual development in statistics of university 
students throughout a fixed time period. Although the study evaluated the conceptual 
understanding of the students, and not their personal epistemologies, it illustrates that the 
epistemological development of students is central to improving understanding in statistics. 
The second paradigm upholds that personal epistemology exists in the form of beliefs, 
and that the learning of an individual is shaped heavily by his or her beliefs (Schommer, 
1998). For example, Schommer, Crouse, and Rhodes (1992) found that a student’s ability 
to understand a statistical passage was strongly negatively correlated with a belief that 
knowledge is discrete. The importance of beliefs about statistics was also emphasized by 
Garfield (1995) who claimed that statistics becomes difficult for students to learn when 
ideas about the subject are in conflict with students’ own beliefs and intuitions about data 
and chance.  
The final paradigm claims that epistemological beliefs exist as a set of resources (like 
published books or authoritative figures) and theories about knowledge and knowing. In 
this case, knowing which resources and theories are activated in a statistical learning 
context could help educators to better understand and address the sources of statistical 
misconceptions. Under this paradigm, research has suggested that the understanding of 
resources is context-dependent (Hofer, 2001). For example, individuals have been known 
to perceive knowledge as subjective in a statistical context, but as entirely objective if it is 
in a mathematical context (Olsen & Morgan, 2005). 
 The aforementioned paradigms are congruous to three categories of epistemological 
models, as described below.  
 
2.1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL MODELS 
 
Developmental and cognitive models The bases of all developmental models of 
personal epistemology are a series of longitudinal studies that analyzed interview data to 
document changes in students’ thinking throughout their education and beyond. In the 
seminal work of Perry (1970), extensive interviews with male students at Harvard 
University during the 1950s and 1960s helped document the students developing their 
views of knowledge and learning. The development was characterized by nine steps, the 
first of which represented a dualistic, absolutist view of knowledge, and the final step, 
indicative of a realistic view of knowledge, represented an understanding that new 
information may cause one’s position to change. The main contribution of this study was 
the understanding that a student’s view of knowledge better explained their experiences of 
learning than motivation study skills or ability—myths, according to Moore (2002), that 
still exist today.  
More recent studies have discerned that all individuals follow the same basic 
developmental sequence, regardless of gender or background, and that any subtle 
differences within early development stages dissipate after the end of formal education 
(Baxter Magolda, 2002; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986). Implicit in these 
models is the viewpoint that epistemological development is the purpose of education, so 
developmental models can be understood as being parallel to the first paradigm of the 
relationship between personal epistemology and education. 
From the developmental models emerged cognitive models for personal epistemology. 
Like their predecessors, cognitive models also describe a move from absolutist, positivist 
thinking to a more relativist, contextualized approach to knowledge (Kuhn, 1991). The 
major difference is that these theories attempt to validate developmental models by using 
structured interviews with standardized evaluation processes to characterize the 
338 
 
epistemological thinking of an individual. For example, King and Kitchener (2004) 
developed The Reflective Judgment Model, which uses three levels to categorize student 
reasoning. Within the first, or pre-reflective level, knowledge is viewed as certain, and 
correct answers are always assumed to exist. This is followed by the quasi-reflective level, 
which indicates the recognition of uncertainty and a growing awareness of how knowledge 
is constructed. The final, or reflective level, was characterized by the ability to place 
knowledge in context, and the willingness to re-evaluate perspectives on receiving new 
information.  
   
 Multidimensional models Although there has been substantial empirical evidence 
supporting developmental models and cognitive theories regarding personal epistemology, 
epistemological beliefs can also be characterized by a set of mostly independent 
dimensions. This theory, as proposed by Schommer (1990), was the basis of the second 
paradigm relating education to epistemological theory, as it allowed researchers to 
speculate that specific, independent beliefs could affect learning. Using existing literature, 
at first Schommer hypothesized what these dimensions could be, and then, using a factor 
analysis, he found four significant dimensions. Hofer (2000) performed a similar study 
based on Schommer’s work and refined the definitions of the dimensions, as summarized 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. The dimensions of personal epistemology as summarized by Hofer (2000) 
 
Dimension Description 
Certain/Simple Knowledge Whether knowledge is certain and absolute, or 
continuously evolving 
Attainability of Truth The existence (or non-existence) of absolute truth  
Justification for Knowing The reasons for learning and/or knowing  
Source of Knowledge  Whether knowledge is accepted from an 
authoritative source, or reasoned out through 
objective and subjective means  
    
There have been other studies proposing multi-dimensional theories, but they have been 
generally of a similar nature (Buehl & Alexander, 2001) and have produced results with 
only minor points of divergence from Hofer’s (2004a) dimensions, so we do not review 
these studies here. 
 
Integrated models From the developmental and multidimensional models and theories, 
individuals’ personal epistemologies can be understood as evolving through a non-linear 
and recursive path. However, the field has been dominated by research that adopted a 
domain-general narrative. In other words, the studies in this area have assumed that the 
beliefs about knowledge and knowing could be investigated from a generalized 
perspective, implying that the personal epistemologies of individuals are generally the 
same across fields (e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Kuhn, 1991). Individuals who held 
different beliefs about knowledge between varying disciplines were seen as having 
unsophisticated or underdeveloped viewpoints (Op ‘t Eynde et al., 2006). 
Based on the recognition that disciplinary differences have resulted in different 
approaches to problem solving and acquisition of knowledge (Alexander, 1992), the 
possibility of a domain-specific epistemology should not be neglected. Indeed, the 
institutionalization of these fundamental differences can be seen in most school curricula, 
where learning typically happens in classes separated by discrete subjects with independent 
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content and methods (Op ‘t Eynde et al., 2006). In this sense, the separation of the sets of 
resources (such as textbooks and teachers) can lead to a context-dependent model for 
personal epistemologies, as in the third paradigm mentioned above. The plausibility of a 
domain-specific approach to epistemology has been the topic of an increasing number of 
qualitative studies of both a within-subject nature (Schommer et al., 1992) and a between-
subject nature (Liu & Liu, 2011). Some found that epistemological beliefs tend to be 
moderately domain-general (Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker, 2001) whereas others 
suggested epistemological beliefs to be largely domain-specific (Buehl, Alexander, & 
Murphy, 2002).  
 
Summary The discussion about whether personal epistemology can be represented by 
developmental/cognitive, multidimensional, or integrated models is on-going. Given the 
empirical evidence supporting all of these models, more than one model may be appropriate 
for each context. In some cases, an integrated model that combines aspects from various 
other epistemological models has been suggested. Most commonly, multi-dimensional 
theorists have claimed that there are developmental components within their various 
dimensions (Bendixen & Rule, 2004) and cognitive theorists have suggested that 
developmental sequences vary by domain (Clinchy, 2002).  
 
2.2.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATISTICAL AND MATHEMATICAL  
EPISTEMOLOGIES 
 
Many have suggested that any epistemological interpretation of knowledge may be 
significantly enhanced by considering the historical context of the knowledge (e.g., Ernest, 
1991; Hanson, 1962; Lakatos, 1976). Because there has been very little research on 
statistical epistemologies, a historical narrative of statistics proved to be informative in 
designing this research project and analyzing the resulting data.  
Statistics as a field of study first began to take shape in the 18th century, when it was 
used to describe systematically collected census data from various states (Freedman, 2002). 
In other words, the study of statistics arose out of social and economic needs to understand 
state demography and make political decisions. The relations between statistics and 
mathematics, as is now commonly understood, emerged much later, following the 
development of probability theory (Hald, 1998). Accordingly, it is possible to postulate 
that, as statistics developed as an academic discipline out of real-world problems and 
questions, there may be aspects of social context that affect how an individual experiences 
and approaches statistics. Nonetheless, given that statistics is now inextricably linked to 
mathematics and the lack of clarity regarding domain-specificity and domain-generality in 
epistemological research, any discussion on statistical epistemologies that does not 
mention mathematical epistemologies could run the risk of being incomplete. In that vein, 
our study sought not only to characterize the personal epistemologies of statisticians in 
academia (first research question) but also to compare their mathematical and statistical 
epistemologies (second research question).  
There is scarcity of research on the personal epistemologies of academics in 
mathematics. Nonetheless, some studies have reported on the epistemological perspectives 
of practicing research mathematicians. For example, Burton and Morgan (2000) created 
epistemological profiles of various researchers by analyzing the language they used in 
research publications, and then they corroborated and verified their findings with the 
academics in interviews. The authors found no discernible patterns between the 
epistemologies of the research participants. This could be attributed to the constitution of 
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their sample, which included a mixture of 35 statisticians, pure mathematicians, and 
applied mathematicians.  
Furthermore, at least as early as the 1980s many studies in both psychology and 
mathematics education have supported the theory that individuals learn by constructing 
their own knowledge (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1988, 1989; von Glasersfeld, 1984, 1989). Studies 
in statistics education (Garfield, 1995; Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2007) have also suggested that 
individuals in statistics learn by constructing knowledge. Thus it would be interesting to 
see whether the personal epistemologies of statisticians in academic are consistent with 
constructivist theories of learning.  
 
3. METHODS 
 
3.1.  RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
Research in statistics education has indicated that statistical misconceptions may be 
held even by advanced university students and experienced researchers outside of statistics 
(delMas et al., 2007; King & Kitchener, 1994). Indeed, Hofer (2001) suggested that a 
critically aware stance towards knowledge of a field is only really commonplace amongst 
experienced researchers. To that end, the sample for this research included academics 
currently researching within the field of statistics.  
Six individuals, including three lecturers, one reader, and two professors of statistics 
each based at one of two leading UK universities, were interviewed for this study. The 
academic field of statistics covers many different areas with different foci. Moreover, it is 
commonplace in the UK for researchers in statistics to have completed their taught studies 
in a subject other than statistics, usually mathematics. The areas of research of the 
participants, as well as their undergraduate degree and sex, are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. A summary of the study participants 
 
Pseudonym Areas of Research Undergraduate Degree Sex 
S1 Applied statistics: Estimation 
problems; high-dimensional 
statistical inference; statistical 
applications 
Mathematics Male 
S2 Theoretical statistics: Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo methods; 
Bayesian statistics 
Mathematics Female 
S3 Applied statistics: Bayesian 
statistics 
Mathematics Male 
S4 Theoretical statistics: Non-
parametric statistics; statistical 
applications 
Mathematics Male 
S5 Applied statistics: Bayesian 
statistics; biostatistics 
Mathematics Male 
S6 Applied statistics: Medical 
statistics 
Mathematics, operational research, 
statistics, and economics 
Male 
 
Given the exploratory nature of the study and the small number of participants, it was 
not possible to ensure sample heterogeneity. Indeed, five of the six participants were male. 
Although some research has indicated no gender differences in epistemological 
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development post-education (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Belenky et al., 1986), the nature of 
the sample does not allow this issue to be explored. In addition, all of the participants had 
an academic background in mathematics. Whereas this is commonplace in the UK, not all 
statisticians come from the same academic background; some may have undergraduate 
degrees in statistics or other fields, such as psychology or economics. Finally, the number 
of years of research experience of participants was also not considered when selecting 
participants, based on the assumption that all post-doctorate researchers in statistics might 
adopt a personal epistemology that availed to statistical learning. In any case, exploring the 
possible role of these and other factors (e.g., the cultural and departmental settings) would 
require a much larger sample and was beyond the scope of the exploratory study reported 
here. 
 
3.2. INTERVIEW DESIGN  
 
The interview protocol for the study was designed and refined over two sets of pilot 
interviews with seven PhD candidates from UK universities. The first set of pilot interviews 
was a series of open discussions with participants in order to develop questions and divide 
them into groups that would cover each of Hofer’s (2000) dimensions of personal 
epistemology (see Table 1). In addition, based on the fact that the development of 
epistemology is moderated by personal experiences and interactions with others (e.g., 
Packer & Goicoechea, 2000), questions regarding the sociocultural aspects of statistics 
were included. Finally, given the observed tendency of the participants to compare 
mathematical and statistical thinking, questions were developed in order to explore more 
explicitly the relationship between mathematics and statistics.  
The second set of interviews revealed two problems that resulted in revisions to the 
interview protocol. First, in answering a lot of the questions, the participants would often 
use terms such as “statistical thinking” or “statistician” loosely, and there was a need to 
disrupt the flow of the conversation to ask them to clarify what they meant. Thus another 
set of questions was added at the start of the interview to address the meaning of these 
terms. Second, the participants were unaware of their own views about statistical 
knowledge, or they appeared to have not discussed them openly to a great extent ever 
before. Prompting questions to allow the participants to talk about their epistemological 
beliefs both directly and indirectly were therefore added. The final interview protocol is 
given in the Appendix.  
 
3.3. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The interviews were transcribed and coded using the dimensions based on Hofer’s 
(2000) description of personal epistemologies as described in Table 1. Each of these 
dimensions was explored in turn in order to characterize the personal epistemologies of the 
research participants and address the first research question. In addition, and in order to 
address the second research question, the data analysis also included a direct exploration 
of the participants’ beliefs about statistical knowledge in relation to other subject areas, 
notably mathematics. Content analysis was performed and findings were compared to 
existing literature on personal epistemologies. 
In considering which epistemological models may be appropriate to characterize the 
participants’ personal epistemologies (first research question), it was not possible to 
consider developmental models; as developmental models assume a gradual progression in 
epistemological development over a period of time (e.g., Moore, 2002; Perry, 1974), 
previous research on these models has been longitudinal. However, it was possible to assess 
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the suitability of a cognitive model for the personal epistemologies of the statisticians 
interviewed, because the cognitive models maintain the same properties of developmental 
models, but are assessed by using structured interviews with a standardized evaluation 
process (King & Kitchener, 2004). To that end, the interviews conducted in this research 
included the question: “Can you tell me how your understanding of statistics evolved and 
developed over time, throughout your education and career?” 
The answers to this question were evaluated according to King and Kitchener’s (2004) 
Reflective Judgment Model, which categorizes an individual’s reasoning as pre-reflective, 
quasi-reflective, or reflective, each level representing a deeper understanding of how 
knowledge is constructed. The suitability of cognitive models and the reflective nature of 
the participants are discussed in the final part of Section 4.1.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The report of the results we obtained from analyzing the interviews with the six 
participants are organized into two sections, each corresponding to one research question. 
 
4.1. THE PERSONAL EPISTEMOLOGIES OF ACADEMICS IN STATISTICS 
 
This section addresses the first research question by exploring the main characteristics 
of the personal epistemologies of the study participants. These characteristics are presented 
according to Hofer’s (2000) four dimensions of personal epistemology as in Table 1: the 
certainty of knowledge, the justification for knowing, the attainability of truth, and the 
source of knowledge. The section concludes with a proposal for an integrated model for 
personal epistemology. 
 
Certainty of knowledge The content analysis revealed that the participants believed 
that different aspects of statistics could be understood with varying levels of certainty. The 
participants’ beliefs were classified into three categories: objectivism, constructivism, and 
sociocultural factors. An explanation of these categories and examples that the participants 
gave are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. A summary of the categories under certainty of knowledge 
 
Category  Description Examples 
Objectivism Described aspects of 
statistical knowledge 
and statistics that were 
interpreted as objective 
Mathematics; Logic; Probability Distributions; 
Axioms; Proof 
 
Constructivism Described aspects of 
statistical knowledge 
and statistics that were 
interpreted as open to 
interpretation or 
constructivist in nature 
Bayesian topics; Openness; Worthwhile to challenge 
knowledge; Limitations to statistical methods; 
Different approaches to same problem (choice of 
statistical methodology); Conclusions not authoritative; 
Interpretation of the problem; Model choice; Model 
assumptions 
Sociocultural 
factors 
Described statistics and 
statistical knowledge 
as dependent on social 
context  
Journalism and media; Trust of statistics; Statistics as a 
craft; Statistical problems can have emotional 
connotations; Historical context; Interdisciplinary 
interactions; Presentation of statistics affected by needs 
of audience; Shift of statistical paradigm towards 
Bayesian models 
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Any mention of objectivism related exclusively to mathematical aspects of statistics 
having to do with proof, mathematical axioms, and logic, and how they are applied to 
probability theory. However, belief in absolute truth was always qualified with a reference 
to the axioms assumed in order for the truth to exist. For example, when discussing about 
mathematical theories used in statistics, S6 described how these theories are “logically 
irrefutable” and “always true.” Soon afterwards, though, S6 recognized that the theories 
were derived from “mathematical axioms that are assumed to be true,” which would in fact 
be consistent with constructivism, and not objectivism.  
 The most dominant aspect within the data was therefore the association of statistics 
with a constructivist view of knowing; within statistical modelling and inference, each of 
the participants described statistical knowledge as actively constructed from either 
mathematics or probability. This was exemplified by S5: 
 
S5 Within statistics…the nature of the knowledge is…true within its own framework, 
but judgment is needed to decide on its own applicability. Within its own set of 
axioms, it is objectively true…the crucial thing is whether it is applicable to the 
situation I’m facing, and that’s a subjective judgment. 
 
S5 claimed that knowledge within statistics and mathematics can only be seen as true 
“within its own set of axioms.” To that end, there would be no objective truth within 
statistics, as any “truth” would only come into existence through engagement with these 
axioms.  
Knowledge was also described as being constructed from the assumptions supposed 
when making model choices. Whereas proof in mathematics is based on axioms taken to 
be true, modelling in statistics always starts with assumptions made about data. All of the 
participants described how the assumptions are pertinent to statistical analysis, and how 
statistics cannot be objective as a result of these assumptions. S4, for example, claimed that 
“the assumptions will never be true, it’s only about whether they’ll be good enough. 
Because none of the assumptions are true, ever, all statistical analysis is actually formally 
wrong and incorrect.”  
Moreover, all of the participants explicitly rejected any notion of absolutism and 
objectivism within statistics. The apparent potential for misinterpreting a problem, using 
an unsuitable statistical model, or making inappropriate assumptions, led the participants 
to recognize the limits of certainty within statistics, and therefore discuss the merits of 
challenging published knowledge within statistics. A constructivist way of knowing 
therefore seems representative of the participants. 
Through discussing sociocultural aspects of statistics, all of the participants agreed that 
there was a problem with public trust of statistics, with four of the participants mentioning 
the issue of trust unprompted and the remaining two explaining the matter after being asked 
directly. Remarkably, three of the participants exercised the same quote popularized by 
Mark Twain and Benjamin Disraeli when discussing the issue of trust in statistics: “there 
are lies, damned lies, and statistics.” The quote was mentioned with reference to the fact 
that members of the public misinterpret statistics frequently, and that, as a result, “good” 
statisticians view statistics very gingerly. In the words of S1, “statisticians, in my opinion, 
are a very skeptical bunch.” The link made between the public misunderstanding of 
statistics and individual skepticism of statistical knowledge is an example of how 
participants’ certainty of knowledge may be characterized by radical constructivism, which 
views knowledge as being adapted to fit a configuration of the social world (e.g., von 
Glasersfeld, 1984). More specifically, the fact that “good statistical thinking” was related 
to public trust and misunderstanding of statistics could suggest the suitability of a radical 
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constructivist model. However, a full assessment of the relevance of sociocultural factors 
and the suitability of radical constructivism would need to be to the topic of further 
research. 
 
Attainability of truth This dimension was used to encompass all data that described the 
extent to which knowledge in statistics is discovered, constructed, or invented. Two 
categories used to describe the attainability of truth were assigned at first: constructed and 
discovered. However, it emerged from the data that it has been possible for many of the 
participants to become successful within their field without any thought given to the 
attainability of truth, so a third category called irrelevant was introduced. The descriptions 
and examples of these categories are given in Table 4 and are discussed in turn below. 
 
Table 4. A summary of the categories under attainability of truth 
 
Category  Description Examples 
Constructed Described aspects of statistics 
interpreted as being invented 
or constructed by the 
knower’s mind 
Data; Axioms; Mathematical statistics; 
Assumptions; Statistical framework; Questions 
driving statistical work 
 
Discovered Described aspects of statistics 
interpreted as an absolute 
truth or as having been 
“discovered” 
Consequences of axioms, questions, and 
assumptions; Mathematical statistics; Solutions to 
practical problems; Nature of the underlying 
system 
Irrelevant Mentioned irrelevance of 
whether knowledge is 
constructed or discovered   
Does not care; Does not matter; Had not thought 
about it before 
 
Analogous to the “objective” aspects of statistics described within certainty of 
knowledge, the viewpoint that knowledge is discovered as absolute truth was limited to 
mathematical statistics or aspects of statistics that were constructed around mathematics. 
More precisely, the participants indicated that truth in statistics is limited to a pre-specified 
statistical framework. To illustrate this, when talking about a specific example relating to 
drug doses in medical statistics, S6 said: 
 
S6 I could give a result that says a certain dose for these trials is safe for them. I’ve discovered 
that result—I’ve not invented it—that sounds like it’s fabricated. I’ve done it by all the 
correct methods and followed a set procedure. I may have discovered that 100mg is the 
safe dose given my sample, but someone using…different data to inform them might have 
a different answer, so there are no absolute truths there.  
 
The participants implied that given a set of data with a statistical problem or question, 
follow-on knowledge can be seen as a discovered truth. For example, with particular 
reference to S6’s question about a safe drug dose, he went on to explain that it would be 
possible to know absolutely what the sought dose was given a certain data set. Within 
statistics, then, truth was broadly explained to be constructed or invented, with the absolute 
truth being referred to as unattainable or non-existent by most of the participants. 
There was some disagreement, however, on the subject of construction and “invented” 
truths within mathematics, with half of the participants arguing that truth in mathematical 
statistics was constructed and the other half seeing it as absolutely discovered. More 
strikingly, however, was the tendency to describe this discussion as irrelevant. This could 
be explained by what was said by two of the participants. For example, on being asked 
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about the attainability of truth, S5 responded: “I haven’t got a clue! No idea. Don’t care.” 
before breaking into laughter. This highlighted that it was possible for S5 to lead a 
successful academic career in statistics without having put much (or any) thought into the 
attainability of truth within statistics. S4 also admitted to having “never thought about that.” 
To add to this, S3 noted that different famous statisticians were entitled to have different 
opinions regarding the attainability of truth to his own, further re-enforcing the idea that 
the attainability of truth was irrelevant to the participants. 
These findings are concurrent with research by Quale (2008, 2012) who claimed that 
ontological consequences of epistemological beliefs can exist subconsciously or 
independently of the epistemological beliefs themselves. In other words, whether or not the 
participants thought about the attainability of truth within statistics has not necessarily had 
an effect on how they learnt statistics and improved as researchers. This potential 
irrelevance was also perceived by Hofer (2000) who described the emergence of 
attainability of truth as a central factor in her study as an unexpected finding. 
To conclude, although it is clear from the data that there is no absolute attainable truth 
in statistics and that, through discussion, the participants concluded that most “truths” in 
statistics are constructed, the relevance of the attainability of truth is probably unimportant 
to the participants. This is contrary to many of Hofer’s studies (2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997) proposing attainability of truth as a dimension of personal epistemology. This could 
be attributed to the demographic makeup of the research participants, as the participants in 
Hofer’s studies were school-aged students. In this case, we may hypothesize that someone 
with a mature epistemological stance would understand the attainability of truth to be 
irrelevant, whereas someone with a naïve stance would have their thoughts influenced by 
their understanding of the attainability of truth. Future research can examine this 
hypothesis. 
  
Justification for knowing The third dimension used in the content analysis concerned 
the justification for knowing—that is, beliefs about what motivates the development of 
statistical knowledge and why it might be important. Four main reasons transpired from 
the content analysis: data, problem-driven research, pure intellectual pursuit, and 
sociocultural motivations. These are discussed in turn below.  
The first and most ubiquitous reason was data; each participant mentioned the 
centrality of data to statistics as well as how data could motivate statistical endeavors. S1, 
for example, explained that “there are a wide variety of different problems that statisticians 
are faced with, and these are often as a result of being presented with data.” The centrality 
of and emphasis on data-motivated statistics within the interviews should not be 
underestimated, as all of the participants also used data to describe their research.  
The second justification for knowing that came out of the content analysis emphasized 
the importance placed on problem-driven research. To illustrate this, when asked about the 
main characteristics of statistics, S4 said: 
 
S4 To me, statistics starts with the design of an experiment, in which you collect data, and 
then, developing methods that will help you analyze data. And in the end, applying those 
methods to interpret and draw connections to the real scientific question that you had 
before you even began the exercise. 
 
The emphasis here is not on the data itself, but on the collection and subsequent analysis 
of data that was motivated or influenced by a reality-based problem. The participants gave 
examples of collaborating with individuals from a wide variety of fields, ranging from 
astrophysics and medicine to politics and advertising.  
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The third justification for knowing was split between applied (S1, S3, S5, and S6) and 
theoretical statisticians (S2 and S4). Whereas the applied statisticians interviewed placed 
emphasis on problem-based statistics, the theoretical statisticians placed importance on 
pure intellectual pursuit, and interest in the study and development of statistics. For 
example, S3 claimed that “it doesn’t matter whether [the statistical] process has 
applications. It just is interesting in its own right.” To add to this, S2 commented that even 
though “mathematics has traditionally always been a subject that everyone says is 
beautiful…statistics can be beautiful too!”  
The final category within justification for knowing revolved around the sociocultural 
context of the subject. A lot of the statistical examples that the participants discussed related 
to a social context of statistics. For example, S2 described how companies selling 
consumerist goods take advantage of statistics for advertising, as well as the context of 
statistical applications in the financial sector. Furthermore, S6 explained that “[statistics] 
is always applying methods to real-world data problems, providing meaningful quantities 
that people can understand, but also a measure of error around those estimates.” The 
emphasis here should be placed on the fact that S6 recognizes the relevance of producing 
“meaningful quantities that people can understand,” thereby implicitly acknowledging the 
social context of statistics.  
In order to relate justification for knowing to the theories of personal epistemology, it 
is helpful to use a social constructivist theory of learning. Three of the four justifications 
for knowing explained in this subsection (data, problem-driven, and sociocultural reasons) 
emphasize the importance of the interactions of the participants with their surroundings 
and social world. In particular, the fact that statistical research was portrayed by all the 
participants as reality-based is consistent with one of the main principles for social 
constructivism as set out by Driscoll (2000). The anomaly in the findings is the intrinsic 
beauty of statistics as a justification for knowing because this interest does not appear to 
be socially located. It would be unsurprising, however, if this belief was more common 
amongst participants who are presumably sufficiently interested in statistics to make a 
career out of it.  
 
Source of knowledge The final dimension examined in the content analysis 
encompassed all information appertaining to how statistical knowledge is created or 
discovered, and was labelled source of knowledge. The beliefs of the participants were 
interpreted to be largely consistent with a constructivist approach to learning with two 
dominant features: the development of statistical knowledge and the collaborative nature 
of statistics. 
The first of these was described indirectly by all of the participants in response to the 
question that asked how statistical knowledge developed. For instance, S1 responded: 
 
S1 The traditional way is that people will read published papers and this will result in the 
improvement of knowledge. As well as this, people go to conferences, give seminars, and 
knowledge is disseminated in these sorts of ways. Then, from the sort of cutting-edge 
research articles, people will write research monographs that take important bits from 
various pieces of research, and synthesize them into a coherent whole that can be read by 
less of a specialist [audience] than the original researchers. Then there’s another kind of 
agglomeration process where people write textbooks. The most important bits that surface 
in the monographs will often surface in these textbooks and get taught to graduate students, 
undergraduates, and so on. There’s a sort of filter at every stage…as to what becomes the 
important stuff for people to know about.  
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The responses of the other participants were similar. The process described here is one 
that satisfies the assumptions behind Lakatos’ (1976) heuristic, which describes how, 
following inter-subjective scrutiny and publication, new knowledge in mathematics goes 
from being at first tentative and subjective to being internalized as objective knowledge in 
the eyes of the learner. This can be seen by considering the way in which S1 described an 
interpolative process of refining knowledge through critique, publication, re-publication, 
and critique before the knowledge is understood as secure and valuable enough to be 
published in textbooks as information to be taught to students. Even though the knowledge 
itself may be constructed from axioms (as discussed in certainty of knowledge and 
attainability of truth), the knowledge in the textbook is at first internalized as objective by 
students and other readers (Lynch & Bogen, 1997). Therefore, because all of the 
participants agreed that any research after first being published must be subject to criticism 
before being understood as valuable, it follows that subjective knowledge goes through a 
reconstructive process to become more objective. 
Implicit in Lakatos’ heuristic and in a constructivist viewpoint is the second main 
feature of the source of knowledge, which was the collaborative nature of work and 
knowledge in statistics, as the nature of submitting work for critique before publishing and 
re-publishing requires collaboration. Some of the participants recalled working with their 
peers during school and university, but all of the participants described the importance 
collaborating with other participants. S5, for example, “strongly believe[d] in statistical 
training in research that needs to be shared as far of possible,” and went as far as saying 
that “the idea of someone sitting on their own doing statistics is just laughable, especially 
in a subject that is only really defined in the context of other peoples’ work.” This was 
followed by a brief discussion criticizing the way in which statistics was usually taught in 
an individualistic way in schools. 
Although most of the participants spoke positively about collaboration, S2 highlighted 
how she might have been influenced by her supervisor:  
 
S2 …you spend three years or whatever doing a PhD, and you’re working quite closely with 
someone who is telling you what to read. Somehow, you’re being, without really knowing 
it…manipulated by your supervisor. So you tend to have very close beliefs to your 
supervisor…It’s always tricky to know whether you are having independent opinions or 
whether you’ve been guided on things…it is also influenced by university syllabuses, of 
course.  
 
In this case, the supervisor could be understood as an authoritative individual who S2 
inadvertently took as a source of knowledge, which would be tantamount to the naïve 
understanding of source of knowledge as outlined by Schommer (1990). It should be 
clarified, however, that as long as S2 did not take her supervisor’s opinion as objective 
knowledge, then the influence of the supervisor could be understood as an environmental 
or contextual influence, which would suit well a theory of social constructivism. Indeed, 
the adoption of Lakatos’ heuristic and a collaborative style to learning and working have 
been described as features of a social constructivist way of knowing (Ernest, 1991, 2011). 
Moreover, S2 also mentioned how the national or professional context may affect thinking 
in statistics.  
The data organized under this category could have also been appropriately modelled 
under an epistemological resources paradigm, whereby the basis of statistical knowledge 
would be understood as a set of context-dependent resources, including peers, published 
works in statistics, and others. However, further research would be required in order to 
identify the range of these resources more accurately. 
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Searching for an epistemological model: An integrated model Following the 
exploration of the dimensions of the statisticians’ personal epistemologies, it is possible to 
suggest an integrated epistemological model that could be used to represent their beliefs. 
Aspects of existing models could be used to represent the views of the statisticians 
interviewed in this study, though no single model neatly captures the complexity of their 
beliefs about statistical knowledge.  
For example, a multidimensional model, characterized by a set of more-or-less 
independent dimensions of beliefs, could potentially represent the statisticians’ beliefs, but 
such a model would not fit in well with the fact that the analysis revealed overlaps between 
different dimensions. The most common overlap was between attainability of truth and 
other dimensions (13 occurrences in total, and at least once by each academic). This raises 
the question about whether attainability of truth is a mostly-independent dimension of the 
personal epistemologies recorded. In any case, however, a multidimensional model should 
not be ruled out completely, as the dimensions other than attainability of truth were more-
or-less independent, as per Hofer’s (2000) findings.  
In considering a cognitive model, all of the participants discussed the development of 
their beliefs about statistics in one of two manners. The first of these was to offer a 
generalized narrative that focused on gradual development, as illustrated in the following 
excerpts: 
 
S2 I think it’s been very gradual. I don’t think there’s been one defining moment... …little by 
little, I found links between things that I didn’t know were going to be there.  
 
S4 It was definitely very gradual. Coming back to your point, if you go and talk to [my 
colleague who is not a statistician], he’d give you a very different picture of statistics. 
What’s interesting about statistics is that amongst a group of ten statisticians, not two of 
them might agree on the right thing to do. 
 
In both instances, the participants perceived their development of knowledge as a 
gradual process. S2 noted the importance of context on her learning, which is a defining 
characteristic of King and Kitchener’s (2004) reflective thinking. The understanding of the 
importance of subjectivity and relativity within the subject was indicated by S4 through his 
comparison of statistics to mathematics. He recognized that different statisticians may have 
different opinions on the solution to a problem (subjectivity) and the potential disagreement 
on what might constitute a “good” statistician (subjectivity and relativity). The comparison 
portrayed mathematics as a less reflective field, but this may be reduced, although the 
differences may have been heightened by S4 for comparative reasons; this is discussed 
more in the next section.  
The other four participants answered the question by describing discrete events that 
changed their statistical paradigms. S1 described his master’s thesis as central for his 
intellectual development, whereas S3, S5, and S6 described the learning of Bayesian 
statistics as pivotal moments. For example, S6 said that: 
 
S6 …the turning point was when I really started to enjoy mathematics as an undergraduate, 
and [my lecturer] gave me my first lesson on Bayesian statistics. I couldn’t believe there 
was this new way of thinking…that was the turning point where I got more engaged with 
my subject… 
 
Given that the development of Bayesian theory made space for a relativity and 
subjectivity debate in statistics, it is interesting to note that half of the participants 
mentioned Bayesian statistics as significant to their development. It could be that, by 
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creating a space for reflective thought or subjectivism, the learning of Bayesian statistics 
accommodates more effectively for reflective thought than classical statistics.  
It is clear that the first of the approaches described (as adopted by S2 and S4) would 
affirm a cognitive model for personal epistemology. Whereas the second approach 
described how the participants reached a reflective stage of judgment, it did not describe 
how they reached this stage, so it cannot be inferred whether or not a cognitive model 
would be appropriate in these cases without further evidence. However, by comparing the 
developmental narratives described by S3, S5, and S6 to the way in which they described 
public understanding of statistics, it was possible to strengthen the argument for adopting 
a cognitive model. For example, S5 said: 
 
S5 We have the innumerate using numbers. I’ve got a real thing about the problems 
generated by the powerful innumerate, whether it’s the media or government or anyone, 
because the innumerate love numbers. They fetishize them and wave them around, 
saying “I’ve got my number and you’ve got your number,” and neither of them have a 
clue about where it came from or how it’s constructed.  
 
S5 here is describing the “innumerate” in a way that can be interpreted as pre-reflective. 
The key phrase here is how he described the innumerate as not knowing where numbers 
come from or how they are constructed, because the following discussion then implied that 
the innumerate individuals have an objective understanding of numbers and statistics. All 
of the other participants also mentioned how average members of the public were likely to 
mistrust, misunderstand, or misuse numbers and statistics, reinforcing the idea that the 
participants recognized that they thought in a more critical and reflective way about 
statistics than non-statisticians.  
To summarize, despite the different research backgrounds of the participants, there 
were noticeable patterns in the data. It was clear that, as expected, the participants held 
relativist, constructivist views of statistical knowledge. There was strong evidence to 
suggest that social constructivism would have been a suitable model, though radical (or 
cognitive) constructivism could have also been applied within certainty of knowledge. 
Moreover, the findings seem to be consistent with integrated models of personal 
epistemologies. In any case, the precise nature of this constructivism would need to be the 
subject of further research; it would not be appropriate to generalize from such a small 
convenience sample, not least because of the varying research backgrounds of the 
participants.  
 
4.2. STATISTICAL AND MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGIES 
 
This section addresses the second research question by investigating the similarities 
and differences between the participants’ beliefs regarding mathematical and statistical 
knowledge. In order to more fully capture the complex nature of the participants’ beliefs, 
this section opens with an exploration of the structure of the relationship between 
mathematics and statistics, according to the beliefs of the study participants. Following 
this, the results are presented according to Hofer’s (2000) four dimensions of personal 
epistemology presented in Table 1: the certainty of knowledge, the justification for 
knowing, the attainability of truth, and the source of knowledge. We conclude with an 
argument for the domain specificity of mathematical and statistical personal 
epistemologies. 
 
The relationship between mathematics and statistics There were two initial reactions 
to the question asking about the relationship between mathematics and statistics. The first 
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of these – expressed by S1, S3, S5, and S6 – was to describe statistics as an independent 
field with its own theoretical framework and way of thinking. S1, for instance, said he was 
“very happy with statistics being its own branch with its own characteristics.” S5 seemed 
more surprised by the question, and responded: 
 
S5 First of all, statistics is not part of mathematics. Statistics in its broadest sense is not a 
subset of mathematics. Maths is an enabling thing of statistics, just as statistics is an 
enabling technology for other subjects…maths is useful for statistics through probability 
theory…it’s wonderful stuff. But it’s not statistics…there are lots of other things to learn 
apart from that when doing statistics.  
 
These four participants portrayed mathematics as an enabling tool or part of the 
statistical process. With these four participants (and especially with S5), there was also a 
sense of adamancy in the answers, suggesting a certainty in their own identities and the 
role of mathematics in statistics. 
The other approach, expressed by S2 and S4, was to initially describe statistics as a part 
of mathematics. For example, S2 said she was “quite happy for statistics to be 
mathematics.” This was, however, qualified with “…but I’m not sure if you ask a 
mathematician, they’d say the same thing,” followed by an explanation that even if 
statistics is described as a branch of mathematics, statistics requires a different way of 
thinking to other areas of mathematics. To illustrate the differences between mathematics 
and statistics, S4 described the relationship as follows:   
 
S4 Within statistics, there are two components. There’s the mathematical component, and the 
craft component. With the mathematical component, the nature of the knowledge is 
exactly the same as maths, in the sense that it’s true within its own framework, but 
judgment is needed to decide on its own applicability. Within its own set of axioms, it is 
objectively true…the crucial thing is whether it is applicable to the situation I’m facing, 
and that’s a subjective judgment [the craft component]. 
 
S4 also described statistics as a part of mathematics, though he chose to distinguish 
statistics by the description of a subjective, “craft” component. The fact that S2 and S4 
chose to describe statistics as a part of mathematics could be attributed to the fact that they 
were both working in theoretical statistics, whereas the other four were involved with more 
applied research. Alternatively, it may be that the way in which statistics is taught as a 
subordinate of mathematics could affect the way in which individuals perceive the 
relationship between mathematics and statistics. Indeed, all but one of the participants (S6) 
had academic backgrounds in mathematics only. Moreover, S2 noted that although it is 
uncommon, statisticians may come from non-mathematics backgrounds, and that these 
individuals might hold different epistemological beliefs to those with a background in 
mathematics. S1 mentioned that differences in the research culture of different institutions 
and countries might also influence one’s perception of the relationship between 
mathematics and statistics. 
All references to the relationship between mathematics and statistics in the transcripts 
were tabulated and used to produce Figure 1, which illustrates the relationship between 
mathematics, probability, statistics, and the real world. Each arrow represents references 
made by at least two participants indicating the relationship between concepts or 
disciplines. The direction of the arrow indicates which discipline or concept supports or 
informs the other. For instance, the real world gives rise to data; pure mathematics is the 
basis of probability; and so on. Two topics, namely data and probability, were mentioned 
by all six participants unprompted. As discussed in the literature review, there is a deep 
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relationship between mathematics and statistics, although the historical context of this 
relationship was only highlighted by S5.  
 
  
Figure 1. Participants’ beliefs about how statistics is related to  
mathematics via probability 
 
Certainty of knowledge Notwithstanding the uncertainty of the relationship between 
statistics and mathematics as portrayed by the participants, it was still possible to make 
comparisons between the epistemologies attached to these subjects for each of the 
dimensions mentioned in the answer to the first research question. Regarding certainty of 
knowledge, all of the participants described differences between mathematics and statistics 
when it came to this dimension. The viewpoint that was ubiquitous amongst the participants 
can be illustrated by S4’s discussion of the differences between statistics and mathematics:  
 
S4 …statistics does branch away from maths in some sense…there is no right or wrong answer, 
obviously…I would rather say that statistics is not so rigorous as mathematics. But you can 
still get answers that are more deeply meaningful than if you are stricter or more rigorous.  
 
S4 highlighted the differences between personal epistemologies in the two subjects; 
mathematics is taken as more “rigorous” or objective. S1 also highlighted objective 
qualities of mathematics: 
 
S1 Even in the purest of mathematics, you make definitions and you ask yourself what are the 
consequences of the definitions given the axioms that you impose…given definitions made, 
the logical consequences of those definitions are absolute, and under the axioms of logic 
that mathematics uses. In that sense, you could say that I see mathematics objectively.  
 
Whereas S1 explicitly refers to objectivism, it is possible to suggest that his account 
also has some constructivist aspects; the absoluteness within mathematics is described to 
be dependent upon the axioms, which were later labelled by S1 as “invented, as opposed 
to discovered.” In other words, even though the participants were quick to talk about 
objective qualities of mathematics, it was clear that they held constructivist epistemologies 
in this regard. 
The type of constructivism applied to the certainty of knowledge within mathematics, 
however, seemed to be a possible point of divergence from the statistical epistemologies 
of the participants. With respect to statistics, a constructivist way of understanding was 
deemed appropriate, whereas within mathematics, no mention was made of how their 
Real world 
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Theoretical 
statistics 
Applied 
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understanding of mathematics could adapt to fit the world. To the contrary, all of the 
participants made comments that could imply that individuals change their observed 
configuration of the world in order to understand mathematical constructions.  
 
Attainability of truth The most common way in which this dimension was addressed 
was to make a comparison based on the structure of mathematics and statistics. In 
particular, most of the participants compared the attainability of truth in pure mathematics 
to that in probability and theoretical statistics, and attainability of truth in applied 
mathematics to that in applied statistics. These comparisons were usually made separately. 
For instance, to relate pure mathematics to theoretical statistics, S1 said: 
 
S1 I would have thought that the more you move towards pure mathematics, the more you are 
discovering and the less you are inventing…only at the theoretical end [of statistics] is one 
looking to prove theorem. If you prove a theorem, it has the safe logical correctness as proof 
in mathematics. There’s no difference. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, when asked whether knowledge in mathematics was 
discovered or invented, S6 responded: 
 
S6 I was about to say perhaps in some realms of applied mathematics, but that could be 
statistics! So in pure mathematics, I’d say no. Ideally, pure mathematics should be as 
objective as possible, and that’s a distinction from applied statistics.  
 
However, S5 did concisely encompass most of the areas of mathematics and statistics 
together when discussing the nature of truth within the disciplines: 
 
S5 …you need to distinguish from different sorts of maths as well, like pure maths and applied 
maths. There is very little difference between thinking probability theory and pure 
maths…[but] applied mathematicians have to think differently. They do some proofs and 
mathematical stuff, but some of them actually need to think about what applies in the real 
world, and then it becomes a craft issue. Then it becomes very similar to statistics, because 
they need to ask themselves whether their assumptions fit the real world. The only 
difference is that the applied mathematicians don’t tend to have stochastic elements to 
their conclusions.  
 
In short, similarities in attainability of truth between mathematics and statistics were 
made between appropriate sub-disciplines of each subject. To that end, as with the 
statistical epistemologies of the participants, the limits of the relevance of the attainability 
of truth within mathematics were also explained by three of the participants (S3, S4, S5), 
with S5 saying that the only difference being that “statisticians use probability and will 
have a stochastic element to their work.” He then went on to explain that as with his opinion 
on statistics, the attainability of truth was something that did not matter to him.  
It should be noted that the participants’ opinions about knowledge in mathematics were 
expressed differently in the different parts of the interview. Specifically, in the sections of 
the interview which focused primarily on statistics, it was more usual for mathematics to 
be portrayed as discovered truth and infallible, whereas in the section of the interview that 
asked specifically about mathematics, more considered, in depth thoughts about 
mathematics were offered. Kvale (1996) discussed this phenomenon, explaining that 
individuals often use stronger language when asked to make direct comparisons. These 
discrepancies were taken into account during the content analysis. 
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Justification for knowing Within statistics, four main justifications for knowing 
statistics emerged from the analysis—data, problem-driven motivation, sociocultural, and 
intrinsic beauty—with particular emphasis placed on the first three. Within mathematics, 
these categories were also appropriate to the interviews, albeit with different emphases. 
Whereas data, problem-driven, and sociocultural reasons were mentioned by the 
participants (mentioned twice, twice, and thrice respectively by three participants), intrinsic 
beauty was given higher prominence as a justification for knowing (mentioned nine times 
by five participants). To illustrate the importance of the intrinsic beauty of mathematics, 
S6 said: 
 
S6 Mathematics has traditionally always been a subject that everyone says is 
beautiful…Statistics can be beautiful too if derived from pure mathematics, but a lot of the 
times it can be ugly with messy formulae. But in mathematics there’s not always a direct 
focus, and a lot of people are looking at things for pure enjoyment, rather than looking for 
something useful or helpful.  
 
Importance was placed on the fact that mathematics, unlike statistics, is less likely to 
need a “direct focus,” and that people may be doing mathematics for “pure enjoyment.” 
Even though S6 recognized that “statistics can be beautiful too,” his statement put relatively 
more focus on the intrinsic beauty of mathematics.  
There were also four instances where three of the participants interviewed placed 
relatively less importance on sociocultural justifications for knowing mathematics. In one 
case, after explaining that statisticians need to understand the context of their work or 
statistics, S1 was asked whether he thought this was the case in mathematics. He responded: 
 
S1 Rarely, I mean there are various subjects like mathematical biology that are studied in 
applied maths…but I don’t know whether they’d call that mathematics.  
 
In the preceding dialogue, S1 explained that the main reason mathematics requires less 
context is because there are objectively correct consequences of mathematical axioms if 
logic is used correctly. Tied into this is the fact that everyone except S4 also implied that 
questions and problems are much less likely to motivate problems in mathematics.  
The consequence of sociocultural-driven, problem-driven, and data-driven reasons for 
studying mathematics being less prominent is that, with the participants, the case for social 
constructivism in mathematics is much less strong than that for social constructivism in 
statistics. This is because, by emphasizing the role of the intrinsic beauty of mathematics 
as a reason for studying it, the participants downplayed the role of the interaction of 
mathematics with their surrounds and social world. These findings appear to contrast with 
the work of Ernest (1991, 2011) that suggests social constructivism has a central role in 
mathematical epistemologies. However, because the evidence is very case-specific, further 
investigation is required. Moreover, Ernest’s work focused on the epistemological beliefs 
of students—not of academics—thereby offering a possible reason for the discrepancy. 
  
Source of knowledge Within statistics, two factors were of consequence. The first of 
these, Lakatos’ (1976) heuristic, described the process of internalization of statistical 
knowledge through publication. No noteworthy comparisons regarding Lakatos’ heuristic 
were made with regard to mathematics, so even if the participants believed they acquired 
mathematical knowledge in the way that Lakatos described, it was not possible to infer this 
from the data. The relevance of Lakatos’ heuristic to mathematics would need to be the 
subject of further study. 
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Nonetheless, the second observed source of knowledge for the statistical 
epistemologies—collaboration with others—was mentioned as important in mathematics 
by three of the participants. S1, for instance, mentioned the collaboration between 
mathematicians and theoretical physicists, S2 mentioned biologists, and S3 talked about 
mathematics in astronomy. Moreover, what S2 implied about how supervisors and teachers 
can influence personal epistemologies may also apply to mathematics, as her argument did 
not refer to a statistical context in particular. It should be noted, however, that S1 suggested 
he “would’ve thought the collaborations with scientific fields would be much less, and 
much less wide-ranging” in mathematics than in statistics, bringing into question the extent 
to which collaboration was viewed as a source of knowledge for mathematics.  
In brief, there was a lack of data regarding the sources of knowledge in mathematics, 
so the content analysis did not allow for substantive comparisons to be made in this area. 
Instead, the similarities and differences noticed in the research conducted for this paper 
could be used as an indication that further study in this area may be fruitful and of interest 
to educational researchers.  
 
Summary The main similarities and differences between the statistical and 
mathematical epistemologies of the participants, and hence the findings for the second 
research question, are summarized in Table 5 according to each of Hofer’s (2000) 
dimensions of personal epistemology. For completeness, a summary of the relationship 
between mathematics and statistics according the data from this study is also included in 
Table 5. Given the comparisons made in answering this question, and in particular given 
the multifaceted relationship between mathematics and statistics, it is possible to add to the 
domain-specificity/domain-generality discourse in epistemological research that was 
highlighted by Op ‘t Eynde et al. (2006). The data alone highlighted some differences 
between the mathematical and statistical epistemologies of the interviewees, thereby 
supporting the domain-specific argument; the domain-general argument would require 
more inter-disciplinary congruence between the personal epistemologies discussed in this 
research. In addition, the described relationship between mathematics and statistics 
indicated that the participants view the two subjects, although strongly related, as separate 
entities, thus strengthening the argument to consider the relevance of domain-specificity.  
To conclude, comparing the mathematical and statistical epistemologies of statistics 
academics is a substantive research task that deserves its own study that can add to the 
growing literature in inter- and intra-disciplinary epistemological research. It would be of 
particular importance to consider the discussion on the structure of the two subjects, and 
whether the findings from this paper suggest it would be more appropriate to consider pure 
and applied mathematics, probability, and all branches of statistics to be investigated 
together or separately. 
 
Table 5. Similarities and differences between the mathematical and statistical personal 
epistemologies of the participants in this study  
 
Dimension Comparison 
Certainty of 
knowledge 
The participants alluded to constructivist ways of understanding both 
mathematics and statistics. Interaction with the real world seemed more 
important for the development of statistical epistemologies when 
compared to mathematical epistemologies.  
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Attainability of truth Parallels were drawn between pure mathematics and theoretical 
statistics, and applied mathematics and applied statistics. As with 
statistical epistemologies, the participants seemed to be unworried by 
the properties of this dimension. 
Justification for 
knowing 
Much more emphasis was placed on intrinsic beauty of mathematics as 
a justification for knowing than in statistics. Unlike within statistics, 
social constructivism appears to be less relevant to the mathematical 
personal epistemologies of the participants.  
Source of knowledge Mathematics was described as a collaborative subject, but not to the 
same extent as statistics. Further study is needed.  
The relationship 
between mathematics 
and statistics 
Real world problems and observations give rise to data, which is used 
in applied statistics and mathematics. Tools developed in pure 
mathematics are necessary in probability and theoretical statistics, 
which form the backbone of applied statistics. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The driving force behind this investigation was to offer insight into what set of 
epistemological beliefs would be most availing to statistical learning and for reducing 
misconceptions in statistics. Going by the results presented above, it seems that experts in 
statistics adopt constructivist views of their field and tend to distinguish their beliefs about 
statistical knowledge from mathematical knowledge. However, before establishing the 
epistemological aims for students in statistics, it will be necessary to expand on the present 
study. In particular, the results in this paper could be used to design an epistemological 
questionnaire for administration to a larger sample, which will be necessary in order to 
improve validity, particularly given the exploratory nature of the present study, the small 
number of participants, and the relative homogeneity of the sample. In particular, it is worth 
noting all of the participants came from mathematics, which might have generated some 
bias in the results because, in practice, statisticians come from a wide variety of academic 
backgrounds. In addition, the results highlighted potential epistemological differences 
between statisticians of different specialties, another possible topic for future research.  
There is also the opportunity to use the results to help complement research in statistical 
thinking. Pfannkuch and Wild, for example, have published several studies concerning the 
thought processes of professional statisticians (e.g., Pfannkuch & Wild, 2000; Wild & 
Pfannkuch, 1999), aiming to uncover elements of applied statistical practice and statistical 
thinking for the use of teachers of statistics. Some of the findings from this paper may 
contribute to the discussion on the importance of “variation” within statistical thinking 
(Wild & Pfannkuch, 1999), or to the discussion on the development towards teaching of 
the “art” of statistics (Pfannkuch & Wild, 2000). Although it is important to distinguish 
between statistical epistemologies and statistical thinking, some of the findings in this 
paper may inform research in statistical thinking, which up until this point has been quite 
limited.  
The results in the paper allow the formulation of a hypothesis about what makes 
statistics so prone to student (and indeed, teacher) misconceptions. Traditionally, students’ 
access to statistics education has at times been limited and postponed until the upper school 
years, and once students have been introduced to it, learning of the subject has often been 
part of their learning of mathematics. The results from this study suggest that this approach 
to teaching statistics may be problematic. Teaching statistics as a sub-domain of 
mathematics may ignore important epistemological differences between the two disciplines 
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and may lead to the students applying mathematical epistemologies that may be unavailing 
for statistical learning.  
To that end, curricula that include contextualized learning for statistics and incorporate 
research- and inquiry-based learning could be pursued in order to reduce statistical 
misconceptions (e.g., Burrill & Biehler, 2011; Paton, 1990); the findings of this paper are 
consistent with the recommendations to move towards contextualized learning. Such 
programming and initiatives have been implemented in Israel (Ben-Zvi, Gil, & Apel, 
2007), the USA (Franklin et al., 2007; Lesser & Pearl, 2008), New Zealand (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2007), and other countries. Therefore, given the persistence of 
statistical misconceptions among students (Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2007), a lack of 
contextualized learning alone is not sufficient to explain the challenges in improving 
statistics education.  
One possible explanation could be found in considering the statistical epistemologies 
of teachers. Indeed, statistical misconceptions can be appropriated and compounded by the 
fact that teachers of statistics themselves may apply mathematical epistemologies to 
statistics (Bargagliotti & Franklin, 2015), thus potentially leading students astray from the 
offset. It would also explain why statistics instruction has even occasionally been recorded 
to have negative effect on certain topics of conceptual understanding (delMas et al., 2007). 
Thus, where contextualized learning may be an effective manner to develop the desired 
epistemological beliefs that are most availing to statistical thought and learning, it will be 
ineffective unless the teachers hold such beliefs about statistics. 
In this respect, by bringing together the fields of epistemological research, statistics 
education, and statistical understanding, this paper contributes to the issue of how an 
understanding of epistemic beliefs can improve teaching and learning in both statistics and 
mathematics. Moreover, the comparison between mathematical and statistical 
epistemologies allowed for the argument presented of the domain-specificity of statistics 
and mathematics, thereby contributing to the ongoing debate of the generalizability of 
personal epistemologies (Op ‘t Eynde et al., 2006; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2001). As the 
field gains a better understanding of what productive thinking about statistics involves, like 
in the study of experts’ epistemologies of statistics, significant implications for statistics 
education can follow. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The Interview Protocol 
 
Introduction and Definitions 
 In your opinion, what are the main characteristics of statistics? 
o Name some characteristics of your branch of statistics. 
 How would you describe “statistical thinking”? 
o How do you perceive the “statistical process”? What is the procedure involved in 
doing statistics? 
 In your opinion, what is a statistician? 
o How do you perceive yourself as a statistician? 
 
Justification for Knowing and Attainability of Truth 
 Some hold that solving problems in statistics is a thinking activity involving personal 
creativity. Others argue that solving the problems requires following predetermined, known 
procedures. What is your opinion about this? Why? (modified from Liu & Liu, 2011, pp. 
341–342)  
o Can you give some examples? Do you think that this is an objective or subjective 
process? Or somewhere in between? 
 In your opinion, what are the similarities and differences between statistics, art, and 
philosophy? (modified from Liu & Liu, 2011, pp. 341v342) 
 
Certainty of Knowledge and Source of Knowledge 
 How does statistical knowledge develop? 
o How do researchers work?  
 Would you say research in statistics is mainly an individual or a collective process?  
 Some claim that statistical knowledge is discovered absolute truth, yet others argue that 
such knowledge is invented or constructed by our minds. What is your opinion about this? 
(modified from Liu & Liu, 2011, pp. 341–342) 
o Why? Please defend your answer with examples. 
 Can there be absolute or objective knowledge in statistical research? 
o Do you think that published knowledge in statistics should go unchallenged? 
 
Relationship Between Mathematics and Statistics 
 We just discussed some of the objective and subjective qualities of statistics. How do you 
think this compares to mathematics? 
 What is your understanding of the relationship between mathematics and statistics? 
o How do mathematics and statistics inform each other as subjects? 
 In your understanding, what are the similarities and differences between mathematical and 
statistical thinking? If possible, please explain your answer with examples. 
 Do statisticians need to be able to think mathematically in order to conduct their research? 
How do you think when you are conducting research or solving a problem in your field? 
How do you think this compares to the way a mathematician thinks when they are solving 
a problem or conducting research? 
 
Sociocultural Aspects 
 How do you think statistics is perceived by various groups and members of the public?  
o From your experiences, how would you say that these people relate to statistics? 
 How does this compare to the way mathematics is perceived and experienced by the public? 
 Can you tell me how your understanding of statistics evolved and developed over time 
throughout your education and career? 
